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Goodman and Cavell on fakes
Abstract
What is a fake artwork? This is seldom asked in aesthetics even 
though judging an artwork as excellent or original implicitly posits 
criteria for fraudulent or dubious artworks as well. This article pre-
sents Nelson Goodman’s proposal of how we are to understand 
fakes. It will criticize his predominantly cognitive approach for fail-
ure of incorporating a sense of aesthetic value, thereby leaving the 
possibility of artworks which are fakes but nevertheless originals 
unexplained. Instead Stanley Cavell’s writings on aesthetic judg-
ment are explored establishing a better frame for understanding 
these artworks. 
Keywords fake art, Goodman, Cavell, aesthetic value
Introduction
One theme not especially emphasized in contemporary aesthetics 
and philosophy of art, is the possible epistemological role of fakes 
or forgeries for understanding the aesthetic experience. Imagine a 
unique replica of Mona Lisa replacing the real Mona Lisa without 
visitors to Louvre knowing about it. Would it matter to their emo-
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Volume
17 86
Goodman and Cavell on fakes
Bo Allesøe
tional and cognitive experience? Probably not. Would it matter to a 
skilled connoisseur, an expert in Da Vinci’s work? Probably not. 
What seems to matter is knowledge of whether the artwork is fake 
or not. Knowing the artwork is a fake somehow diminishes the ex-
perience of it. But experts can be wrong also, realizing that what 
they thought was a real Rembrandt, actually was a forgery. Hence, 
it is not enough for the artwork to be known to be real, it must 
somehow be real also. This line of thought allows, of course, for a 
continuous skepticism, but also the hope of what Beardsley (1958) 
expressed as a realism independent of the experience of it. 
But what is it, then, that makes it real? Imagine we discover the 
Mona Lisa actually was painted by one of Da Vinci’s assistants, just 
as skilled and visionary as the master himself. After the initial shock 
erupting the art world has faded, would it matter for the mysteri-
ousness and intricacy of the smile then? Again, probably not. Even 
though we realize it is not a Da Vinci, there is still something real, 
something genuine about Mona Lisa that matters independently of 
whether Da Vinci or the assistant is the creator. One recalls Eco’s 
subtle thinking on what ‘original’ can mean (Eco 1992), or Orson 
Welles pondering, in the movie F for Fake, whether a signature truly 
matters to an art work, as well as quoting Picasso that art is a lie 
making us see the truth. What a lie is, can, of course, mean any 
number of things independent of Picasso’s original intention or 
Welles’ restatement. In a very obvious almost simplistic sense, if we 
assume art as representing something, lying implies the artwork 
simply isn’t what it tries to represent – like Magritte’s famous pipe 
expressing a truth about artistic representations as not being copies 
of the “real world”. In yet another sense lying could imply art as 
characterized by betrayal when we for example realize it is a fake, 
or perhaps from the artist’s point of view when the intention with 
the artwork is misunderstood, or the artist feels estranged from the 
result of the creative process. Lastly, lying might point to a ques-
tion of authenticity, not in the sense of real or forged painting, but 
as a lack of performance either on the artist’s or the judgment-form-
ing audiences’ part. All art is pretending to be art, hence potential-
ly a fake, except for art actually being real or judged as authentic. In 
this last sense, perhaps, we might judge Mona Lisa as painted by 
Da Vinci’s assistant as also a real and genuine painting. But again, 
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how are we to understand this genuineness, what really matters in 
the artwork?   
In the following I will address how judging, aesthetically, the dif-
ference between fake and authentic art is established using two an-
alytical philosophers. The first, Nelson Goodman, who in his Lan-
guages of Art was one of the first to discuss the role of fakes in 
aesthetics, presents us with criteria of what real art is. Goodman’s 
suggestion is, however, found wanting due to its lack of incorporat-
ing a sense of aesthetic value, and I will turn to another American 
philosopher, Stanley Cavell, to suggest another and better possibil-
ity. The general point of the article is the failure of judging artworks 
to be fakes by considering objective and factual criteria only, the 
aesthetic value of an artwork in itself must be considered as well. 
Within the limits of this article, related questions regarding artist’s 
intention and the broad reception of artworks, will be left out.  
Goodman on fakes
Goodman’s discussion of fakes is framed around two problems. 
The first is accounting for the difference between allographic and 
autographic art, which, lacking relevance for the concern here, we 
will not address. The second problem, however, is directly related 
to our discussion since Goodman questions why any aesthetic differ-
ence between a deceptive forgery and an original work, between 
for example a Vermeer and a superior imitation of it would exist 
(Goodman 1976, 99).  Part of the answer, Goodman claims, implies 
leaving the possibility of establishing any difference by natural sci-
entific means – through x-rays, microscopic examination or chemi-
cal analysis – behind. These will provide a difference between the 
physical condition of the two paintings, but show us nothing about 
any aesthetic difference in the appearance of the paintings. Instead 
Goodman propose something like a ‘common-sense’ departure, 
that a potential aesthetic difference is established by ‘merely look-
ing’, i.e. “…looking at the pictures without any use of instruments 
other than those customarily used in looking at things in general.” 
(op.cit., 101) Furthermore, establishing a difference by merely look-
ing depends not only upon natural visual acuity, but also upon 
practice and training of the ability to discriminate.     
Given these assumptions Goodman presents the problem as fol-
lows: “…is there any aesthetic difference between the two pictures 
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for x at t, where t is a suitable period of time, if x cannot tell them 
apart by merely looking at them at t? Or in other words, can any-
thing that x does not discern by merely looking at the pictures at t 
constitute an aesthetic difference between them for x at t?” (op.cit., 
102) Yes, claims Goodman, the information that the two pictures are 
different at t, will make a difference for x – even if x is unable to 
actually see the difference between the pictures at t. Recall, that 
‘merely looking’ also depends upon practice and training of the dis-
criminatory capacities. Therefore, given the piece of information 
the relationship between x’s present and future looking will be af-
fected. The information will inform the character of x’s present 
looking and thereby guide what is selected from past experiences of 
items and aspects to be used in x’s present looking and onwards 
(Steele 1977, 255). Hence, from x’s first-person perspective, even 
though I cannot tell them apart by looking, the fact that one picture 
is an original and one is a fake
“…constitutes an aesthetic difference between them for 
me now because knowledge of this fact (1) stands as evi-
dence that there may be a difference between them that I 
can learn to perceive, (2) assigns to the present looking a 
role as training toward such a perceptual discrimination, 
and (3) makes consequent demands that modify and dif-
ferentiate my present experience in looking at the two pic-
tures.” (Goodman 1976, 105)
This cognitive position, i.e. taking informative factual knowledge 
about the aesthetic object to be an essential component of its identi-
fication and appreciation (Parson and Carlson 2008, 35), serves to 
make a general point about authenticity for Goodman (1976, 109).  
How come, asks Goodman, that any knowledgeable layman to-
day can easily tell a Van Meegeren from a Vermeer, when the most 
venerated experts in the 1930s could not (op.cit, 110)? The answer 
is, that the experts were fooled because presented with a single un-
familiar picture at the time, they had to decide the likelihood of the 
picture being a Vermeer. Once the wrong decision was made, it 
had a self-reinforcing effect. Due to each subsequent fake paint-
ing judged to be a real Vermeer, the criteria for what counted as a 
Vermeer changed in favor of a Van Meegeren. However, by the time 
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the fraud was exposed, all the Van Meegeren were “…subtracted 
from the precedent-class for Vermeer, but also a precedent-class for 
Van Meegeren has been established.” (op.cit., 111). Based on this 
factual knowledge, classificatory criteria for the difference be-
tween the paintings were thereby established, hence perceptually 
telling them apart became more straightforward even for laymen. 
Thus, judging the authenticity of a painting depends on the sets of 
examples available and used in the “…exercise, training, and devel-
opment of our powers of discriminating among works of art…” 
(op.cit., 111) Or, to put it another way, the authenticity of a picture, 
includes not only the aesthetic properties found and established by 
looking at it, but also those properties determining how it is to be 
looked at. 
Now, it would be easy to conclude that Goodman is intending to 
argue that these properties determining how to look at pictures, 
hence criteria for authenticity, somehow consist of lists of assess-
ments. But he is keen on ensuring that subjective evaluations are 
not what he is after, “We are not called upon here to make such 
particular comparative judgments or to formulate canons of aes-
thetic evaluation” (op.cit., 109) But if that is the matter, then, as 
Steele puts it “…Why should the difference be called aesthetic?” 
(1977, 257). As such the criteria established are more related to judg-
ments made by an art historian or archivist, i.e. aiming at establish-
ing objective criteria – the right representation of classification by 
authorship - for the difference, and relating this to our perceptual 
discriminating powers and exercises. Goodman fails to provide us 
with a reasonable account of why or how the information or knowl-
edge making a difference is credible and justified in an aesthetic 
sense. Furthermore, as stated in the introduction, experts including 
art-historians can be wrong and withdraw seemingly objective cri-
teria for discriminating the real from the fake (Duton 1983). This, 
however, implies considering aesthetic values, not as the canons of 
aesthetic evaluation Goodman denounces in the quote above, but 
taking seriously how aesthetic judgments since Kant (1790/2000), 
i.e. judging some piece of artwork as genuine or beautiful, imply a 
universality which cannot be impersonal. Aesthetic judgment com-
bines some sort of subjective response with an aspiration to univer-
salality. In lieu of the lack of absolute certainty for discriminating 
the real from the fake, of making an objective classification, or es-
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tablishing canons for how artworks are to be evaluated, the possi-
bility of this other point of departure for establishing aesthetic dif-
ferences will be our next concern. We will therefore turn to Stanley 
Cavell whose writings address the possibility of aesthetic judg-
ments in light of an overall skepticism, that the lack of objectivity 
(as a classificatory rationale), “…of conclusiveness in aesthetic ar-
gument, rather than showing up an irrationality, shows the kind of 
rationality it has, and needs.” (Cavell 2002, 86)     
Stanley Cavell on aesthetic judgments
It is common to divide Cavell’s writings on aesthetics and art into 
several themes: the first, which will concern us here, focus on aes-
thetic judgment and modernism; the second addresses the ontol-
ogy of specific artistic media, and the third contains concrete analy-
ses of literature, opera, film, etc. (Hammer 2002; Mulhall 1994) As 
our question above revolves around aesthetic judgments, we will 
focus on some of the early papers in Cavell (2002). 
Approaching Cavell’s thinking let us start by noting that he con-
ceives answering the question “What is art?” as depending on an-
swering “…why it is we treat certain objects, or how we can treat 
certain objects, in ways normally reserved for treating persons.” 
(Cavell 2002, 189, original italics) Implied here is not treating art-
works as objects to be classified as done by Goodman, but rather as 
expressing the kind of genuineness and individuality we normally 
reserve for people with whom we engage. Our concerns, when en-
gaging these people, are of course subjective. But it is still a respon-
sible subjectivity defending both the correctness of the concern, as 
well as replacing the concern with disappointment or even sorrow 
in the face of insincerity or lack of genuineness on the part of these 
people. Artworks and people, Cavell seems to claim, are to be con-
sidered like ends in themselves. Recognizing falseness, insincerity, 
fraud, etc., depends therefore on the same capacity as recognizing 
genuineness and sincerity (op.cit., 190). I understand Cavell as 
claiming that connecting this complex relationship between a re-
sponsible subjectivity and the normative universal import of (in)
correctness is what aesthetic judgments are about. 
Understood this way the aesthetic value lies less in the supposed 
originality by authorship of the artwork, its classification, than in 
recognizing its aesthetic value. Thus, it will be possible to recognize 
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as aesthetically meaningful the examples Grasset (1998, 266) states, 
namely that Rembrandt signed works done by his pupils, or Pous-
sin painted figures for Gaspard Dughet who then painted the back-
ground of some of Poussin’s paintings, or painters’ inability, eg. 
Van Dyck, Rodin as well as Bourdelle, to recognize the authenticity 
of their own work. Hence, the value is expressed through the work 
as an end in itself, as an autonomous work, recognizable through 
aesthetic experience. But what does this mean, that a work is auton-
omous, and how does this relate to the idea of fakes?      
For Cavell asking these questions indicates a modern aesthetic 
attitude: “…the experience of the modern is one which itself raises 
the question of fraudulence and genuineness…”(2002, 214). Now 
his point is not that questions like these are not addressed in 
pre-modernity, only they were not forced upon people through ear-
lier art because the “…conventions were deep enough to achieve 
conviction without private backing” (op.cit., 226). In a sense, then, 
modernity presents a condition in which we are, when it comes to 
aesthetic judgment, strangers to ourselves and each other. What 
was fixed previously through tradition and conventions of taste, 
are in modernity not evident sources of authority. So, what is up 
for grabs in modernity is the question of why we accept something 
as a genuine painting, as a piece of art, or not. However, this is not 
a question of conforming to the conventions (as if they were canon-
ized), but, as the quote alludes to, involves some sense of personal 
backing, what Cavell in other places terms voice (Cavell 1979). It 
relates to the Kantian idea above, i.e. connecting subjective claims 
with some sort of universality. But where the universality for Kant 
seems to amount to no more than a projection of the subjective 
claim to a intersubjective whole, for Cavell it denotes the possibili-
ty of the individual voice to become actually shared, i.e. recog-
nized as achieving a common validity (Laugier 2015, 64). In other 
words, how the subjective voice involves a claim to community, or 
in our case, how an artwork can serve as an experiential basis for a 
new conversation of what art is and can be.   
Thus, the condition of modernity implies lacking any “…a priori 
criteria for defining a painting, what matters is that we realize that 
the criteria are something we must discover, discover in the conti-
nuity of painting itself.” (op.cit., 219). Where in ordinary cases we 
acknowledge something as being correct just for me or us, what we 
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discover through the continuity of painting, is how (if it does) a 
specific painting speaks for painting as such. Cavell uses painting 
as an example here, but other artforms are implied here as well. 
Furthermore, I assume here that aesthetics/the art process for 
Cavell spans the relation between the artist, the work and an audi-
ence, with the possible acknowledgment of a given work as art ob-
taining within this relation. Hence, it is through painting and look-
ing at a painting, reading and writing a novel, as such, that any 
criteria for something being a work of art is to be discovered. Being 
art generally is not made up of a priori criteria abstracted from or 
applied to the aesthetic process but is acknowledged as being part 
of and expressed through the process itself. Furthermore, there is a 
subtlety in Cavell’s use of words in the quote, namely the relation 
between discovery and continuity. When we speak of discovery 
emphasis is usually on something new, whereas continuity indi-
cates a continuation of something. This difference noted, how are 
both, then, related to the discovery, to the aesthetic process?
First of all, Cavell and Goodman both seem to agree on the prob-
lematic in a priori presenting a canon, a list of criteria for what is an 
artwork. At least Goodman claims so. For as claimed above, he 
ends up trading a canon in for another kind of abstraction, namely 
one based on the formal relation between the artist and his work. 
The real artwork has less to do with the aesthetic value of the work 
itself, than with establishing the right formal relation between art-
ist and artwork. A relation detected from a place external to the ar-
tistic process itself. For Cavell, however, the aesthetic value of an 
artwork involves, as said above, a complex relationship of continu-
ity and discontinuity towards the tradition “…of which it is an in-
heritor and voice.” (op.cit). The non-genuineness and fraudulence 
quoted above being part of the modern aesthetic attitude, is char-
acterized by the failure of realizing this. This attitude, Cavell claims, 
is characterized by eluding and failing to assemble any critical 
powers (op. cit 208), i.e. it fails at being a voice as expressing an 
individual critical understanding of art aiming at a new shared va-
lidity. Both could be exemplified by either an amateur landscape 
painting, not being a fraud but still not being genuinely a piece of 
art, i.e. it is a personal expression but without providing a claim to, 
or being recognized as speaking on behalf of landscape painting as 
such. Or the van Meegeren discussed above just reproducing the 
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tradition, pretending to be the work of an original artist, failing to 
become a voice.   
Second, the lack of a priori criteria is not tantamount to no in-
volvement of criteria at all – this is where the relation between dis-
covery and continuity returns. Cavell’s understanding of criteria is 
heavily influenced by his reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical In-
vestigations (see Mulhall (2014) and Affeldt (2014) for an extended 
discussion of Cavell’s reading). By criteria is often meant some-
thing like rules for applying a concept (or a rule for applying rules), 
or for evaluating whether something is more or less correct, beauti-
ful, heavier, tastier etc. than something else (Cavell 1979, 6ff). In this 
sense criteria function like a measuring rod we can appeal to, when 
aiming for agreement in judging some piece of work to be genu-
inely art. Cavell disagrees with this description. 
First of all, it makes criteria appear like the canon he argued 
against as shown above. Second, according to Cavell (1979, 13) cri-
teria do not serve as a separate basis or foundation for how we 
agree in judgment. Rather criteria are already interwoven with cas-
es where we claim to know something is the case. In this sense, cri-
teria express both our agreement, a continuity in the sense of our 
attunement in describing something, but also the possibility of dis-
covery of a new and different way of understanding and speaking 
about things. In case of dissonance no independent source of au-
thority, like a canon, exists for us to appeal to in responding to the 
dissonance. At best criteria can here serve as an impetus for under-
standing what the dissonance consists in, and how, if possible, one 
should and could move on from here. Third, criteria therefore point 
toward the indeterminacy of our aesthetic judgments, they express 
a possible renewal and advance of understanding (McMahon 2014, 
52) but also the possibility of failure. Fourth, as expressions of un-
derstanding criteria are claims to community, i.e. “…reminders and 
vehicles of reorientation – to and on behalf of both others and one-
self…” (Eldridge 2003, 6), as well as claims to reason. As Cavell 
(1979, 20) expresses it, “The wish and search for community are the 
wish and search for reason”. So, the genuineness of an artwork lies 
both in its reminding us of central traits of the aesthetic practices 
and thoughts from which it historically sprung (again both from the 
creation and reception side), and its claim (its voicing) of reorient-
ing these aesthetic practices and thoughts by being the focus of a 
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new conversation of what art generally is. It is a reasonable process, 
carried out between you and me but on behalf of us, and without re-
course to some external place for acknowledging art.          
Take for example, the introduction of the cut-up technique con-
nected both with Dada and Burroughs (Skerl 1986). By now it is a 
familiar technique, but initially it critically pushed the self-definition 
of literature asking in what sense it can be, perhaps already is, com-
posed of already made elements. It thereby reminded us, from a par-
ticular point of view, of the agreed definitions or criteria for what a 
text is and how it is handled, and in the process reorients our agree-
ment of these criteria, but again by using the already given medium 
of a text. Furthermore, its genuineness was expressed through the 
sincerity of arguing and presenting the conditions of its own making 
and claiming responsibility for the general idea, making a claim to 
community, of what is brought forth. For Cavell this would there-
fore indicate an originality of an artwork and how it is to be judged 
compared to Goodman’s more archival judgmental criteria. Good-
man’s formal criteria are, in the end, supposed to reach an objective 
agreement, a conclusion about the proposed fakeness or originality 
of an artwork established outside the artistic process or tradition it-
self. For Cavell, the matter is more about expressing one’s voice from 
inside an inherited tradition, than achieving agreement as to the cor-
rect formal representation of an artwork. Thus, the artist “…is not to 
discount his subjectivity, but to include it; not to overcome it in 
agreement, but to master it in exemplary ways. Then his work out-
lasts the fashions and arguments of a particular age. That is the 
beauty of it.” (Cavell 2002, 94) But also the potential tragic side of it, 
for outlasting the fashions of the age is dependent upon the claim to 
community being addressed, recognized and continued in the ongo-
ing conversation of what art is and can be. 
So, for Cavell the dissolution of fakeness is not a question of es-
tablishing true authorship or evidential knowledge about the art-
work in question. It is a matter of understanding and judging in 
what sense an artwork questions its own inherited conditions es-
tablishing a new genuine exemplar for art.       
Conclusion
I have argued here, that criteria for establishing the originality or 
the fakeness of artworks will need to consider the notion of an aes-
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thetic value related to the aesthetic experience besides establishing 
any genuineness through historical or curatorial evidence. The lat-
ter was exemplified by Nelson Goodman who sought criteria for 
the difference between fakes and non-fakes in objective criteria es-
tablishing the authorship of artworks. It was questioned whether 
these criteria actually establish any aesthetical difference. Instead ap-
peal to aesthetic value was made referring to Stanley Cavell’s views 
on aesthetics and modernity. For Cavell a genuine artwork has less 
to do with authorship, than with questioning and responding to art. 
This process, then, presents new arguable ways of understanding 
art, i.e. establishes new criteria by and through which art can be-
come a potential meaningful part of our lives. Unlike a fake, a gen-
uine piece of art presents a claim to community, an exemplary way 
in which we can learn something new about ourselves and each 
other, becoming more attuned without being aligned or harmoni-
ous in the process.   
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